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Abstract 
This paper considers a technique for calculating the unconditional failure intensity of 
any given non-coherent fault tree. Conventional Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
techniques involve the evaluation of lengthy series expansions and approximations are 
unavoidable even for moderate sized fault trees. The Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) 
technique overcomes some of the shortfalls of conventional FTA techniques enabling 
efficient and exact quantitative analysis of both coherent and non-coherent fault trees.   
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1. Introduction 
The Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) technique developed by Rauzy in the early 
1990’s has been shown to significantly improve the accuracy and efficiency of 
conventional fault tree analysis for coherent systems [1]. More recently attention has 
focused on the analysis of non-coherent systems using the BDD method. The top 
event probability can be calculated directly from the SFBDD, which encodes the 
structure function for a non-coherent fault tree.  Quantification of the failure 
frequency of non-coherent systems could be accomplished by conventional fault tree 
methods [5]. In 2001 an extension of Birnbaum’s measure of importance for the 
analysis of non-coherent systems was developed [4]. This extension can be used to 
calculate the unconditional failure intensity of a non-coherent fault tree directly from 
the SFBDD. This provides an exact and efficient means of calculating this parameter 
and is described in this paper.  
 
2. Non-coherent Systems 
Fault Tree structures can be categorised as either coherent or non-coherent according 
to their underlying logic. If during fault tree construction the failure logic is restricted 
to the use of the AND gate and the OR gate, the resulting fault tree is said to be 
coherent. If however, the NOT gate is used or directly implied, the resulting fault tree 
can be non-coherent. A more precise definition of coherency can be obtained by 
considering the structure function of the fault tree [2].  
A fault tree is coherent if its structure function φ(x) complies with the definition of 
coherency given by the properties of relevance and monotonicity. The first condition 
requires that each component is relevant; this means that each component contributes 
to the system state. 
φ(1i,x)≠φ(0i,x)      for some x    
The second condition requires the structure function of the fault tree to be 
monotonically increasing, i.e. non-decreasing.  
φ(1i,x)≥ φ(0i,x)    ∀ i 
Where: 
φ(1i,x)= φ(x1,…,xi-1,1,xi+1,…,xn) 
φ(0i,x)= φ(x1,…,xi-1,0,xi+1,…,xn) 
 
The structure function of a fault tree is monotonically increasing (non-decreasing) if 
as the state of a component deteriorates the system state either remains the same or 
also deteriorates. The three possibilities, depending on the state of the remaining 
components, are shown in figure 1.   So the system either remains in the same state 
(working or failed) when component i fails. 
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Figure 1: Non-Decreasing Structure Functions 
 
For a structure function of a non-coherent system the remaining possibility, shown in 
figure 2, can also occur. This system is non-coherent for component i, hence, for some 
state of the remaining components, the system is in a failed state when component i 
works and a working state when component i fails.  
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Figure 2: Non-coherent Structure Function 
 
3. Calculating the SFBDD of a Non-coherent Fault Tree 
Rauzy [1] developed the If-Then-Else (ite) method for computing a SFBDD for a 
coherent fault tree in 1993. This method has the advantage of producing a SFBDD, 
which encodes Shannon’s formula, i.e., if f(x) is the Boolean function for the top 
event of the fault tree, then by pivoting about variable xi, Shannon’s theorem states: 
       
21)( fxfxf ii +=x  
 
Where f1 and f2 are Boolean functions: 
),....,0,,........,,(
),....,1,,........,,(
11212
11211
nii
nii
xxxxxff
xxxxxff
+−
+−
=
=
  
 
This is represented by the ite structure given in equation (1).  
ite(xi,f1,f2)       (1) 
 
Where xi represents a variable and f1 and f2 represent logic functions. This ite 
structure is interpreted as follows: 
If xi fails then consider the logic function f1 
else consider the logic function f2. 
 
Thus in the BDD, f1 forms the logic function for the one branch of xi and f2 forms the 
logic function for the zero branch of xi. Figure 3 shows the diagram that represents 
this ite structure.  
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Figure 3: ite structure for ite(xi,f1,f2) 
 
The process to convert a fault tree structure to a SFBDD first requires a variable 
ordering scheme to be chosen for the variables (basic events) in the fault tree. Once 
the variables have been ordered the following procedure is employed to compute the 
SFBDD.  
1. Assign each basic event xi in the fault tree an ite structure,  
2. Modify the fault tree structure so that each gate has only two inputs 
3. Apply De Morgan’s rules to push the Not logic down to the basic events: 
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where AND is represented by ‘.’ And OR by ‘+’. 
4. Consider each gate in a bottom-up fashion 
5. If two gate inputs are J and H such that: 
J=ite(x, F1, F2)     H=ite(y, G1, G2) 
  
Then the following rules are applied: 
- If x<y, J<op>H=ite(x, F1<op>H, F2<op>H) 
- If x=y, J<op>H=ite(x, F1<op>G1, F2<op>G2) 
 
These rules are used in conjunction with the following identities: 
1<op>H=H,  0<op>H=0  if <op> is an AND gate 
1<op>H=1,  0<op>H=H  if <op> is an OR gate 
Where <op> describes the Boolean operation of the logic gates (AND, OR) of the 
fault tree.  
 
To illustrate this procedure, consider the fault tree shown in figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Non-coherent Fault Tree Diagram 
 
Assuming a variable ordering a<b<c: 
 
Assigning each basic event an ite structure: 
a=ite(a,1,0) 
a =ite(a,0,1) 
b=ite(b,1,0) 
c=ite(c,1,0) 
 
Considering the gates in a bottom-up fashion according to the rules and identities 
introduced above, beginning with gate G1: 
G1=a.b 
G1=ite(a,1,0).ite(b,1,0) 
G1=ite(a,[1.ite(b,1,0)], [0.ite(b,1,0)]) 
G1=ite(a,ite(b,1,0),0) 
 
Now dealing with gate G2: 
G2= a .c 
G2=ite(a,0,1).ite(c,1,0) 
G2=ite(a,[0.ite(c,1,0)], [1.ite(c,1,0)]) 
G2=ite(a,0,ite(c,1,0) 
 
Finally dealing with the top gate, Top: 
Top=G1+G2 
Top=ite(a,ite(b,1,0),0)+ite(a,0,ite(c,1,0)) 
Top=ite(a,[ite(b,1,0)+0],[0+ite(c,1,0)]) 
Top=ite(a,ite(b,1,0),ite(c,1,0)) 
 
The ite structure computed for the fault tree shown in figure 4, is given in equation 2 
and the SFBDD is shown in figure 5.  
ite(a,ite(b,1,0),ite(c,1,0))      (2) 
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Figure 5: SFBDD Obtained for the Non-coherent Fault Tree in Figure 4 
 
4. The Unconditional Failure Intensity of a Coherent System 
The unconditional failure intensity is denoted by wsys(t) and defined as the probability 
that a system fails per unit time at t given that it was working at t=0. This is an 
important system parameter to calculate during quantification since, having 
determined wsys(t) the expected number of system failures in a given interval, 
Wsys(0,t) can be calculated: 
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The unconditional failure intensity of a coherent system can be expressed in terms of 
the criticality function, Gi(q). 
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Where, wi(t) is the failure intensity of component i, and nc is the total number of 
components.  
 
The criticality function, also known as Birnbaum’s measure of component reliability 
importance, denoted by, Gi(q), is defined as the probability that the system is in a 
working but critical state for component i such that the failure of component i would 
cause system failure.  This can be calculated from: 
 
Gi(q)=Qsys(1i, q)-Qsys(0i, q)       (4) 
 
Where: 
Qsys(1i, q) = Qsys(x1, x2,….., xi-1,1,xi+1,….., xn)  is the probability that the system has 
failed and component i is failed.  
Qsys(0i, q)= Qsys(x1, x2,….., xi-1,0,xi+1,….., xn)   is the probability that the system has 
failed and component i is working.  
qi is the probability that component I fails. 
 
Equation 3 enables efficient and accurate calculation of the unconditional failure 
intensity using the BDD technique.  
 
5. The Concept of Component Relevancy / Irrelevancy 
When analysing non-coherent fault trees, both component failed states and component 
working states can contribute to system failure. A component can be either relevant to 
the system state or irrelevant to the system state. If a component is relevant to the 
system state, it can be either failure relevant or repair relevant. Component i is said to 
be failure relevant if the system is in a critical state such that the failure of component 
i would cause the system to fail. Similarly component i is said to be repair relevant if 
the system is in a critical state such that the repair of component i would cause system 
failure. Finally component i is said to be irrelevant if its state has no bearing on the 
state of the system.  
 
Expressions for the failure relevance and irrelevance of a component can be obtained 
from the Boolean expression for the top event. Consider the Boolean expression for 
the top even, Top, given in equation 5.  
 
Top=ab+ a d+ce+bd              (5) 
 An expression for the failure relevance or irrelevance of component a denoted by, 
Topa=1, can be obtained by substituting the value 1 for component a into equation 5.  
Topa=1=b+ce+bd 
    =b+ce 
 
Similarly an expression for the repair relevance or irrelevance of component a 
denoted by, Topa=0, can be obtained by substituting the value 0 for component a into 
equation 5.  
Topa=0=d+ce+bd=d+ce 
 
An expression for the irrelevance of component a, denoted by, Topa=’_’ is obtained by 
taking the product of Topa=1 and Topa=0.  
   Topa=’_’=Topa=1.Topa=0 
=(b+ce)(d+ce) 
                                       =bd+ce 
 
 
6. An Extension of Birnbaum’s Measure of Importance for Non-coherent 
Fault Trees 
Birnbaum’s measure of component reliability is a fundamental probabilistic measure 
of importance [3]. However, Birnbaum developed this measure strictly for the 
analysis of coherent systems. In 2001 an extension of Birnbaum’s measure of 
importance for the analysis of non-coherent structures was developed [4].  
 
When dealing with a coherent system, system failure can only be caused by 
component failure. Hence a component in a coherent system can only be failure 
critical. However, when dealing with a non-coherent system, system failure can be 
caused not only by the failure of component i, (i) but also by the repair of component 
I,  ( i). Thus a component in a non-coherent system can be failure critical or repair 
critical. These two criticalities must be considered separately since component i can 
exist in only one state at any time.  
 
The probability that component i is critical to system failure, can be expressed as the 
probability that component i is repair critical, GiR(q), or the probability that 
component i is failure critical, GiF(q).  
Gi(q)= GiR(q)+ GiF(q)              (6) 
 
This can be obtained from the system unavailability function Qsys(t) that can be 
determined from Henley and Inagaki’s calculation procedure outlined in [5]. 
Component i is failure critical if the system is working, but will fail if component i 
fails. Thus the probability that component i is failure critical is the probability that the 
system is in a working state such that the failure of component i causes at least one 
prime implicant set containing event i to occur. This probability is calculated by 
obtaining the probability that at least one prime implicant set containing event i exists 
at time t and then dividing this probability by the unavailability of component i.  
 
To calculate this probability it is first helpful to re-express the system unavailability 
as three distinct terms having expressed it in the form used by Inagaki and Henley  
.  
Qsys(t)=qiPr[A]+piPr[B]+Pr[C]         (7) 
 
The three terms of this equation are grouped so that Pr[A] represents the probability 
terms which appear together with the failure probability of component i, Pr[B] 
represents the probability terms which appear together with the functioning 
probability of component i ( pi =1− qi), and Pr[C] represents the probability terms 
which do not contain qi or pi , i.e. for which component i is irrelevant respectively.  
 
Now the probability that component i is failure critical is calculated as follows: 
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Similarly the probability that component i is repair critical is the probability that the 
system is in a working state such that the repair of component i causes at least one 
prime implicant set containing event  i  to occur. This is calculated as follows: 
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 The top event can only exist at time t if at least one prime implicant set exists at time 
t. Hence the failure and repair criticality can be calculated separately by 
differentiating the system unavailability function, Qsys(t), with respect to qi and pi 
respectively.  
 
The unconditional failure intensity for a coherent fault tree is expressed in terms of 
the criticality function, Gi(q): 
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This can be now be extended to non-coherent systems as follows: 
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where vi is the unconditional repair intensity for component i. 
This can be then be used to calculate the expected number of system failures in a 
given interval: 
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (12) calculates the number of 
occurrences of system failure due to the failure of component i in a given interval. 
The second term calculates the number of occurrences of system failure due to the 
repair of component i in a given interval.  
 
7. Calculating the Unconditional Failure Intensity of a Non-coherent Fault 
Tree Using the BDD Method 
The BDD Method has been extended to enable full and exact analysis of non-coherent 
fault trees [6, 7].  
The expressions for calculating Birnbaum’s measures of component failure and repair 
importance are given in equations 8 and 9 respectively.  
 
From the definition of component relevance / irrelevance given in section 6, it is 
possible to define Birnbaum’s measure of component failure importance as the 
probability that component i is failure relevant to the system state [6] given by: 
GiF(q)=E[φi=1]-E[φi=’_’]              (13) 
 
Where: 
E[φi=1] is the probability that component i is either failure relevant or irrelevant to the 
state of the system.  
E[φi=’_’] is the probability that component i is irrelevant to the state of the system.  
 
Similarly, Birnbaum’s measure of component repair importance can be defined as the 
probability that component i is repair relevant to the system state:  
GiR(q)=E[φi=0]-E[φi=’_’]            (14) 
 
Where: 
E[φi=0] is the probability that component i is either repair relevant or irrelevant to the 
system state.  
φi=1, φi=0, φ i=’_’  are  the structure function with xi=1, 0 and ‘-’ respectively. 
 
It is possible to calculate E[φi=1], E[φi=0] directly from the SFBDD, the procedure for 
calculating these probabilities is outlined below: 
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Where: 
Prxi(q)  is the probability of the path section from the root vertex to node xi.  
Poxi1(q) is the probability of the path section from the one branch of node xi to a 
terminal 1 node (excluding the probability of xi). 
Poxi0(q) is the probability of the path section from the zero branch of node xi to a 
terminal 1 node (excluding the probability of xi).  
 
Although E[φi=’_’] can be calculated by taking the expectation of the logical product of 
Topi=1 and Topi=0. This is an inefficient means of calculating E[φi=’_’]. An alternative 
technique can be employed which involves computing an intermediate BDD for each 
node from which E[φi=’_’] can be efficiently calculated. The intermediate BDD for 
each node is obtained by ANDing the one and zero branches of the node. An 
expression for E[φi=’_’] is then calculated by multiplying the probability preceding the 
node in the SFBDD by the probability of the sum of all the terminal one paths through 
the intermediate BDD. To illustrate this technique consider again the SFBDD 
calculated in section 3, figure 5.  
 
The ite table for this BDD shown in table 1.  
Node Variable 1 branch 0 branch 
F1 a F2 F3 
F2 b 1 0 
F3 c 1 0 
Table 1: ite Table 
 
The next stage is to calculate each of the terms in equations 15 and 16. The first term, 
Prxi(q) is the probability of the path from the root vertex to node xi, which is recorded 
in Table 2.  
Node Prxi(q) Comment 
F1 1 Root vertex itself 
F2 qa F2 reached via the one branch of node F1 
F3 pa F3 reached via the zero branch of node F1 
Table 2: Prxi(q) for each node in the SFBDD in figure 5 
 
The Poxi1(q) term is calculated by summing the probability of all the paths from the 
selected  node, xi, along the one branch to a terminal 1 vertex, excluding the 
probability of the selected node. Table 3 records Poxi1(q) for each node. 
 
 
 
 
Node Poxi1(q) Comment 
F1 qb 
1 branch of F1 passes to F2 and the 1 branch of F2 
passes to a terminal 1 node 
F2 1 1 branch of F2 passes to a terminal 1 node 
F3 1 1 branch of F3 passes to a terminal 1 node 
Table 3: Poxi1(q) each node in the SFBDD in figure 5 
 
Similarly Poxi0(q) is calculated by summing the probability of all the paths from the 
selected node xi, along the zero branch to a terminal 1 vertex, excluding the 
probability of the selected node. Table 4 records Poxi0(q) for each node.  
Node poxi0(q) Comment 
F1 qc 
0 branch of F1 passes to F3 and the 1 branch of F3 
passes to a terminal 1 node 
F2 0 No terminal one paths 
F3 0 No terminal one paths 
Table 4: Poxi0(q) for each node in the SFBDD in figure 5 
 
Finally E[φi=’_’] must be calculated for each of the nodes in the SFBDD. The 
calculation procedure requires some additional work. An intermediate BDD must be 
calculated for each node xi. The probability of the sum of the disjoint paths through 
this intermediate BDD is calculated and multiplied by the probability preceding the 
node xi to give E[φi=’_’]. The intermediate BDD is computed by ANDing the one and 
zero branches of a node. Each of the nodes in the SFBDD in figure 5 will be 
considered below: 
Dealing with node F1 
F2.F3=ite(b,1,0).ite(c,1,0) 
         =ite(b,ite(c,1,0),0) 
 
The resulting BDD is shown in figure 6: 
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Figure 6: Intermediate BDD for Node F1 
 
 
There is one terminal path through this BDD, bc, the probability of this path is: qbqc 
 
Dealing with node F2: 
1.0=0   The probability of this is zero.  
 
Dealing with node F3: 
1.0=0   The probability of this is zero.  
 
Table 5 summarises the results obtained for E[φi=1], E[φi=0] and E[φi=’_’].  
Node Variable (i) E[φi=1] E[φi=0] E[φi=’_’] 
F1 a qb qc qbqc 
F2 b qa 0 0 
F3 c pa 0 0 
Table 5: Summary of results obtained for E[φi=1], E[φi=0] and E[φi=’_’] 
 
From the results in table 5 and equations 13 and 14 the failure and repair importance 
of each component is obtained as follows: 
 
GaF(q)=qb-qbqc  GaR(q)=qc-qbqc 
GbF(q)=qa   GbR(q)=0 
GcF(q)=pa   GcR(q)=0 
 
From this it is possible to calculate the unconditional failure intensity and then the 
expected number of system failures in a given interval using equations 11 and 12 
respectively.  
wsys(t)=(qb- qbqc)wa+qawb+pawc+( qc-qbqc)va 
         =(1- qc) qb wa+qawb+pawc+( 1-qb) qc va 
 
8. Conclusion 
The unconditional failure intensity is a key parameter to calculate during fault tree 
quantification.  Once the unconditional failure intensity is known it is possible to 
calculate the expected number of system failures in a given interval. Until now it has 
not been possible to calculate the unconditional failure intensity of a non-coherent 
fault tree using the BDD method. In 2001 an extension of Birnbaum’s measure of 
reliability importance to enable the analysis of non-coherent systems was developed. 
This measure can be used to calculate the unconditional failure intensity of a non-
coherent fault tree efficiently and accurately using the BDD method.  
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